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Judicial Review in the Americas: Comments on the
United States and Mexico
Ken Gormley*
I would first like to thank Professor Robert Barker for inviting
me to participate in this impressive forum, and all of our distin-
guished panelists for the honor of joining them in this important
academic endeavor. Their credentials far outshine mine when it
comes to international constitutional jurisprudence; I am still very
much a student in this field. Yet, I do know a bit about American
federalism and the notion of judicial review as it has evolved in
the United States. I would like to begin by commenting on Judge
Smith's excellent synopsis of the United States doctrine that dates
back 203 years. I would next like to add some thoughts about Dr.
Gamas's enlightening presentation concerning Mexico's still-
evolving notion of amparo that teaches us something not only
about Mexico's democracy, but about our own as well.
First, let me pick up on the history that Judge Smith so expertly
wove together, concerning the origins of judicial review in this
country. Let me ask you to close your eyes and try to answer this
simple question: What would the system of laws look like in the
United States today if Marbury v. Madison1 had been decided dif-
ferently? To put it another way: What if Justice John Bannister
Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had prevailed in the
views he expressed in his famous (or infamous) dissent in Eakin v.
Raub2 decided in 1825? What would our constitutional world look
like today?
Justice Gibson was considered one of the great intellectual lead-
ers of that court in the early 1800s. He was not a kook or an
iconoclast in the eyes of the leaders of the bench and bar of the
day. He had served in the State Legislature and, according to his
biography, had enjoyed a rather distinguished career. 3
* Remarks by Professor Ken Gormley at the Symposium on "Judicial Review in the
Americas ... and Beyond" held at Duquesne University School of Law, November 10-11,
2006.
1. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
2. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
3. WILLIAM AUGUSTUS PORTER, AN ESSAY ON THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OF
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Yet, he took a stand in the Eakin case that would be viewed as
almost foolhardy today. He spurned Chief Justice John Marshall's
now-landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison, going out on a
limb to attack it twenty-two years after Marbury was decided. It
is worth noting that the political fireworks sparked by Marbury
had not completely subsided. The successful impeachment of fed-
eral judge John Pickering of New Hampshire (for drunkenness
and insanity) and the near-removal of Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Chase (whose impeachment succeeded in the House but
failed in the Senate) kept the debate about judicial review very
much alive.
4
Eakin v. Raub was an ejectment case, relating to property in
Northampton County - nothing earth-shattering. More impor-
tant than the merits of the case was the side-squabble among the
Justices about the power of the court to even review acts of the
Legislature. Chief Justice Tilghman wrote for the majority that:
'When a judge is convinced, beyond doubt, that an act has been
passed in violation of the constitution, he is bound to declare it
void, by his oath, by his duty to the party who has brought the
cause before him, and (by his duty to) the people ... ,,5
This holding provoked a vitriolic dissent by Justice Gibson, who
devoted most of his ink to the majority's dictum concerning the
doctrine of judicial review. Justice Gibson picked apart the logic
of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison and found it to
be bunk. He wrote: "It is the business of the judiciary to interpret
the laws, not scan the authority of the lawgiver . "... 6 Granted,
part of the job of the judiciary, wrote Gibson, was "to ascertain
and pronounce what the law is; and ... this necessarily involves a
consideration of the constitution." Then Gibson added, as a warn-
ing: "[B]ut how far? If the judiciary will inquire into anything be-
side the form of enactment, where shall it stop?"
7
Justice Gibson admitted that judges take an oath to defend the
Constitution. But, so do legislators and all other public officers.
Judges do not have a monopoly on wisdom or sound judgment:
"Repugnance to the constitution is not always self-evident.. ." he
wrote, and differences of opinion and conflicts in interpretation
JOHN B. GIBSON, LL.D., LATELY CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(1855); THOMAS P. ROBERTS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN BANNISTER GIBSON, LATE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF PENNSYLVANIA (1890).
4. ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1987).
5. Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 339.
6. Id. at 347.
7. Id. at 349.
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"will be inevitable .... "8 As a result, Justice Gibson concluded,
"the legislature is entitled to all the deference that is due to the
judiciary .... ,,9 In other words, acts of the Legislature "are, in no
case, to be treated as ipso facto void, except where they would pro-
duce a revolution in the government." 10
Justice Gibson therefore believed strongly that the Legislature
itself was required to decide the constitutionality of its own acts.
If it made an error and exceeded its power under the Constitution,
that was not the judicial branch's fault. The judge's job was sim-
ply to faithfully interpret the laws. The ultimate check on the
Legislature came from another source. "I am of opinion," Gibson
concluded, "that it rests with the people, in whom full and abso-
lute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by
instructing their representatives to repeal the obnoxious act."11
Thus, the people were perfectly positioned to check legislative
abuses and mistakes, by exerting political pressure on their
elected law-makers and by voting them out of office.
Justice Gibson became well-known in England and in some cir-
cles of American legal jurisprudence for his bold dissent in Eakin.
Soon enough, however, with the gradual solidification of the doc-
trine of judicial review in the United States, his dissent became a
relic. In fact, John Bannister Gibson himself eventually repudi-
ated his own dissent, largely (according to folklore) because he
was passed over for a seat on the United States Supreme Court
after dissing Marbury v. Madison.
What would our country - and our system of laws - look like if
Justice Gibson's logic had won the day? It would look quite a bit
different. Nor would that picture be overly attractive to most of us
today, as we sit here paying tribute to the virtues of judicial re-
view in the Americas.
Archibald Cox, one of the great constitutional lawyers and
scholars of the twentieth century, whose biography I was privi-
leged to write, 12 loved teaching and writing about Marbury v.
Madison. It was part of a broader concept, as he called it, of "Ju-
dicial Supremacy" in American Government. 13 For Cox, there
were really two components of judicial review as it came to evolve
8. Id. at 350.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id.
11. Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 343.
12. KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997).
13. Cox, supra note 4, at 44.
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in the United States. Both of these are quite contra-majoritarian,
as Judge Smith has aptly described. First, our United States Su-
preme Court has the last word with respect to the constitutional-
ity of congressional legislation. This is anti-majoritarian because
it allows the judicial branch to second-guess the will of the people,
as expressed through their elected members of Congress. As Cox
wrote in his book The Court and the Constitution, the irony of this
facet of judicial review is that it rests on an assumption that there
is something inherently unworkable about a system in which
there is no formal check on acts of Congress. 14 That is not neces-
sarily true. In Great Britain, there was generally no check on the
legislative power of Parliament. Rather, members of Parliament
were careful to observe British constitutional traditions in draft-
ing bills, and historically showed great reverence to the British
Constitution even though it was (and remains) unwritten. 15 It is
doubly ironic because under our system as it evolved after Mar-
bury, there is no limitation on the judicial branch other than a
similar sort of self-restraint, a respect for the Constitution, and a
moral sense of duty that hopefully guides judges. So, some branch
has to have the final say, and there is no magic to picking the ju-
dicial branch over the legislative.
The second aspect of judicial review in the United States,
equally anti-majoritarian, is that it established dominance over
the decisions of state courts and state legislatures. 16 This was the
pronouncement of Justice Joseph Story in Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see,17 later extended in Cohens v. Virginia.'8 This facet of judicial
review was important in the early stages of our country's history.
Most personal and property rights were governed by state law.
Sweeping states within the ambit of the United States Supreme
Court's power of review was a dramatic move that in a very real
sense caused the states (and the citizens thereof) to surrender a
piece of their authority to the federal branch (especially the fed-
eral courts), as part of the price of joining the Union.
For Archibald Cox, the wisdom of this two-part judicial review
doctrine in the United Sates lay not in the raw logic of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion in Marbury. That, frankly, was far from
iron-clad. Nor did it lay in the fallacy of arguments articulated by
14. Id. at 58-59.
15. Id. at 59.
16. Id. at 62-63.
17. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
18. 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
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jurists like Justice Gibson in Eakin v. Raub. The truth be told,
these were perfectly plausible at a time when our nation was still
in its infancy.19 For Cox, the wisdom of Marbury v. Madison was
only evident once examined through the light of practical experi-
ence. What is clear in hindsight is that the judicial branch was
the correct place to repose this final constitutional authority, at
least for our unique brand of American Democracy.
Why? Because our country is rooted in the common law. We
are driven by a body of judge-made law that has evolved over cen-
turies. We are a country in which adhering to legal precedent is
central to our system of government. Why does this make a dif-
ference? For one, because federal judges - unlike legislators -
are divorced from politics and the scramble for power; they are
appointed for life with irreducible salaries, making them inde-
pendent of pressures from interest groups, political groups, and (to
a large extent) from self-interest in career-building. Also, given
the nature of our system, in which someone must regularly inter-
pret broad, imprecise language in the Constitution and statutes,
why not have individuals trained and learned in the law interpret
these documents?
Even more importantly, in our system, judges are constrained
by their precedents. This is a fact that we often fail to appreciate.
In our system, unlike many others, judges are bound by the deci-
sions of those who sat on the bench before them. They are steeped
in a 200-year-plus tradition of common law and stare decisis.
They are quite literally bound by those law books on the shelves
surrounding them: Here is the part we often overlook: The beauty
is that, over time, precedent actually limits the zone of potential
discretion that judges may exercise. As issues come before the
courts one by one, Supreme Court precedent builds up like sand
on a shore, narrowing the field of navigation, so that citizens have
clear markers of settled expectations when it comes to predicting
the law. This is one of the great hallmarks of our system.
Legislatures, on the other hand, are not bound by precedent.
They can draft one bill today based on political considerations and
pressures from interest groups, and they can draft a completely
different bill tomorrow. They can bargain, horse trade, cut deals,
and switch positions overnight. This is not necessarily bad. In-
deed, many legislators would consider that to be an essential com-
ponent of their jobs: Legislators are like weathervanes that spin
19. COX, supra note 4, at 58.
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around with gusts of wind, trying to catch the prevailing popular
sentiment, which may be gone in an instant.
That may be a good recipe for accountability to the public and
for getting reelected. However, it is not a recipe for producing a
reliable body of constitutional jurisprudence. What judicial review
has given us, as Archibald Cox so eloquently put it, is a "majestic
sense of continuity."20 It has given us a concept of "rule of law" in
the United States that is far more enduring than any one jurist
bedecked in robes.
That is the essence of American Democracy. It quickly unravels
without the linchpin of judicial review in place.
Let me provide you with several concrete examples so that we
can visualize what our country might look like if Marbury v. Mad-
sion had withered up and Justice Gibson's dissenting logic in
Eakin v. Raub had won the day. Judge Smith mentioned a few
examples, including recent acts of the Legislature that have
sought to engage in jurisdiction stripping. Let me mention an-
other one.
Last February, I had the privilege of testifying in the United
States Senate on the issue of the secret warrantless wiretap pro-
gram initiated by the Bush Administration, aimed at persons
within the United States.21 Although the full expanse of that pro-
gram was - and is still - not fully known, we have learned that
in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, President Bush au-
thorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to monitor and in-
tercept communications between Americans and individuals
abroad, presumably to pierce the al-Qaeda terror network. This
fairly extensive program of NSA wiretaps and intercepting of
emails to and from American persons bypassed the 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), by which Congress had set
up a special court to handle precisely these sorts of emergency re-
quests from the'executive branch. Attorney General Alberto Gon-
zales told the Senate Judiciary Committee that this secret, war-
rantless program was justified by the exigencies of wartime and
that the President as Commander-in-Chief possessed the power to
fight "our enemies" wherever - and however - he saw fit.22
20. Id. at 70.
21. Senate Judiciary Committee Concerning Bush Administration Wiretaps and Scope
of Presidential Power (February 28, 2006) (statement of Ken Gormley, Professor of Law,
Duquesne University School of Law) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Testimony].
22. Id. See also, Ken Gormley, Secret Wiretaps: The Need for Legilsative Reforms,
JURIST, March 20, 2006.
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The Senate hearings in which I participated in many ways re-
sembled a law school debate over the doctrine of separation of
powers and the proper roles of the courts and Congress and the
President in our constitutional system. In discussing a host of
possible options by which Congress might enact a law to clean up
the NSA program and validate it after the fact - in order to give
the President the tools he needs to fight the war on terror - Sena-
tors quickly clustered around two dramatically different types of
proposals. One approach was simply to authorize the Bush Ad-
ministration's program as-is, with the caveat that the executive
branch would be required to consult with Congress (specifically its
Joint Intelligence Committee) to ensure that any secret programs
of searches and seizures were carried out in a constitutional man-
ner. The other approach, which myself and many other constitu-
tional scholars strongly favored, would require the FISA court to
become involved. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would have the
power to review the issue, even if some special mechanism had to
be created to hear certain matters in secret in order to protect na-
tional security. 23
Congress continues to grapple with this issue. Even before the
recent dramatic mid-term elections, however, there were starting
to emerge more and more bipartisan bills (like the Specter-
Feinstein bill)24 that would ensure that the courts would be in-
cluded in the process.
Why is that so important? Because it constitutes an integral
part of the American system of democracy. All roads must lead to
the Supreme Court. We do not have a system in which the Presi-
dent, or even Congress, can unilaterally decide which searches
and seizures violate the Fourth Amendment and which do not. If
Justice Gibson's position in Eakin v. Raub had defined our juris-
prudence, that might be the case. But Justice Gibson lost; his bi-
ography does not even mention the Eakin case. In the American
system created by Marbury v. Madison, the final arbiter with re-
spect to the scope and interpretation of the Bill of Rights must be
the Supreme Court. The very definition of "probable cause" and
"unreasonable" as those words are used in the Bill of Rights pre-
suppose a determination by a neutral and detached magistrate. It
also presupposes that the Supreme Court will have the power to
make the final ruling as to a search's constitutionality. If Mar-
23. Senate Judiciary Testimony, supra note 21, at 22.
24. Eric Lichtblau & Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Agree to Renew Patriot Act, But Want
Tougher Standards on Access to Records, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at A16.
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bury v. Madison had not won the day in 1803, perhaps today it
would be permissible for Congress to give its blessing to certain
secret wiretaps - without the court ever having the chance to re-
view them. Perhaps Congress could say "we are satisfied that the
Fourth Amendment has been satisfied here." But my prediction is
that Congress will eventually enact a law that preserves the role
of the FISA court and the United States Supreme Court in this
process. That is part of the essence of our American system of the
rule of law, in which judicial review plays an indispensable role.
Another slightly different example appeared in the newspapers
recently. In South Dakota, an initiative called the "Judicial Ac-
countability Initiative Law," or "JAIL," was placed on the ballot
for the voters' consideration. 25 The citizen-sponsors wished to
amend the state constitution to make judges in South Dakota
"more accountable," in a rather heavy-handed way. They wanted
to allow convicted felons to sue the judges who convicted them; to
create a special grand jury so that judges could go to jail for mis-
behavior; and to create a "citizens' oversight committee" with the
authority to hear complaints against judges and allegations of ju-
dicial misconduct and to censure offending jurists.
This state constitutional initiative failed, by a wide 90-10 mar-
gin. 26 That is good news, in my view, for our brand of American
democracy. We do not have a system in which the judicial
branch's decisions are checked by a Council of Censures - as was
the case under some of the early, failed state constitutions prior to
Marbury v. Madison. We do not send judges to jail if we dislike
like their decisions - nor do we take away their pay. Judicial in-
dependence is an essential ingredient of judicial review.
If we hold a gun to the head of the judicial branch and dictate
how judges must interpret our statutes and our constitutional
provisions, that is no different than allowing the public to have
the "final say" on each ruling, which is precisely what Marbury
disallowed. We do not have a system in which USA Today polls
govern or in which the citizens gather in the acropolis and give
thumbs up or thumbs down to a particular interpretation of the
Constitution. That is not our system of governance. Indeed, we
know from the Federalist Papers that one of the very reasons the
American Constitution was structured in its current form, with
25. Bob Mercer, If Approved by Voters, JAIL Would Create a 13-Member Special Grand
Jury with Broad Powers to Judge the Actions of Judges, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (SD), Aug.
22, 2006, at Al.
26. Id.
400 Vol. 45
Comments on the U.S. and Mexico
various anti-majoritarian features, was to protect us citizens from
ourselves. Making judges walk the gang-plank with a pistol
pointed at their heads as they render constitutional decisions -
as this group of citizen-activists tried to accomplish in South Da-
kota - would disrupt the proper functioning of judicial review in
this nation.
When it comes to the second aspect of judicial review - i.e., the
power of the United States Supreme Court to review judicial deci-
sions and legislative actions of the states - our world would look
much different if Justice Gibson had won on this front. There
would be no Baker v. Carr27 or Reynolds v. Sims, 28 allowing the
federal courts to review state reapportionment schemes and estab-
lishing the principle of "one person, one vote" in our country. The
federal courts would be required to keep their hands off state po-
litical matters, no matter how corrupt or constitutionally dysfunc-
tional. In a world without Marbury, the Supreme Court would
have been incapable of deciding Brown v. Board of Education29 or
of abolishing the doctrine of "separate but equal." Those matters
would have been left to the states, and most likely would have re-
mained intact. The Supreme Court would have been powerless to
invalidate the "equal application" theory that forbade inter-racial
marriage in many states, or to throw out the "doctrine of interpo-
sition" - a device that allowed states to justify all sorts of racial
segregation schemes. These relics of our constitutional system
would still be alive and flourishing in an American system of laws
stripped of the doctrine of judicial review. States would be the
final arbiters of their own constitutional limits.
Like Jimmy Stewart in It's a Wonderful Life, we can begin to
appreciate how fortunate we are in the United States that deci-
sions like Marbury v. Madison and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee were
rendered by Chief Justice Marshall and other jurists early in our
history when they reached those pivotal crossroads. Without
those decisions, we would look quite different as a nation today.
This is not to deny that there is a certain amount of tension in
our governmental system as a result of placing this awesome
power in the hands of the judiciary. As Judge Smith correctly
pointed out, a certain tug-of-war between Congress and the fed-
eral courts becomes inevitable. It is a constitutional see-saw that
can easily swing too far in the direction of judicial arbitrariness
27. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
28. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and non-accountability if we, as scholars and citizens and judges
and legislators, do not carefully scrutinize the work of the courts
and ensure that they do not cross the invisible line into the legis-
lator's or the states' domains.
How do we accomplish that? The same way our society has ac-
complished it for 203 years, ever since Marbury. We do it through
thoughtful academic and public discourse; through the appoint-
ment and election of judges who are apolitical and deeply commit-
ted to the rule of law; and through an unwavering commitment, as
a democratic republic, to a rule of law based on precedent and
stare decisis. As Archibald Cox so eloquently put it, precedent and
stare decisis limit the sphere of judicial discretion in an incre-
mental fashion over time, like waves of the ocean washing in and
out, giving us "a majestic sense of continuity. ' 30
I have reserved less time to discuss the fascinating history of
judicial review - or its equivalent - in Mexico, only because Dr.
Gamas has done such a thorough job of that. I'm particularly
wary because Dr. Gamas has written a book on the Mexican Con-
stitution - the leading treatise on that subject, heavily footnoted,
in Spanish.31 If you look at it in comparison to the book I have
written on the Pennsylvania Constitution, it is at least twice as
thick. 32 I do not wish to press my luck. Still, I do want to raise a
few of the most fascinating aspects of the Mexican system in our
discussion today.
The starting point for this discussion - for those neophytes like
me who are not well-versed in international constitutional-
jurisprudence - is the fact that Mexico traces its roots to a civil
law history. It is not a country with common law traditions like
the United States and Great Britain. This makes a significant
difference. Mexico's civil law history originates from several
sources: from its Spanish domination for three centuries; from the
heavy influence of the French Revolution that brought with it a
certain disdain for the role of judges due to past abuses; and from
the writ of habeas corpus that had become anchored in the Consti-
30. COX, supra note 4, at 70.
31. Jost GAMAS TORRUCO, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL MEXICANO (2001); See also, Jos6
Gamas Torruco, The Presence of the Federal System in Mexico, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 35, 40
(2005).
32. THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (Ken
Gormley, Jeffrey Bauman, Joel Fishman & Leslie Kozler, eds., George T. Bisel Co. 2004).
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tution of the United States and supplied a model for Mexico in
dealing with abuses of power by corrupt government officials.
33
As Dr. Gamas has explained, the original form of the writ of
amparo appeared in the Constitution of Yucatan in 1841,34 thirty-
eight years after Marbury v. Madison was decided. Let me stop
for a minute before getting into a fuller discussion of amparo by
saying that translating any device in a civil law country to our
notion of judicial review in the United States is tricky business. It
is like trying to apply the designated hitter rule in American
baseball to sports in a country where the national sport is soccer
or cricket. The first fact that is essential to confront here is that,
in civil law countries, judicial precedent is not the driving force of
the legal system. The bread and butter of such a system is the law
of the legislature, reduced to writing in the form of extensive
codes.
Thus, the original Mexican amparo, added in reforms to that
country's Constitution in 1847 and then written into the Federal
Constitution in 1857, 35 was a unique creature without any precise
counterpart in American law. It was a narrowly-constructed pro-
cedural device designed to protect citizens' rights in certain cir-
cumstances - amparo comes from "amparar" which means "to
protect." Initially, it was used by judges to take action when a
citizen was being illegally conscripted into the military, or im-
properly detained, or condemned to death by a firing squad due to
an alleged political crime. Thus, amparo empowered the Supreme
Court of Mexico to step in and to remedy constitutional violations
of a procedural nature in certain circumstances. Limited though
it was, it gave great prestige to the previously under-appreciated
judiciary in Mexico. It also brought prestige to the federal gov-
ernment generally. Suddenly, judges had the power to protect
citizens from certain egregious rights violations. In some ways,
one could compare this to the function of the writ of habeas corpus
under the United States Constitution.3 6 Yet, it was a different
creature, born of Mexico's unique history.
Gradually, the amparo developed to protect citizens in many
more ways. A plaintiff could bring a proceeding in the Supreme
33. Hector Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CALIF.
WEST. INT. L.J. 306 (1979). See generally, RICHARD D. BARKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT (1971); Helen L. Clagett, The Mexican Suit of 'Am-
paro", 33 GEO. L.J. 418 (1945).
34. Zamudio, supra note 33, at 312.
35. Id. at 313.
36. Id. at 309, 317.
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Court, and eventually the intermediate appellate courts, to protect
constitutional rights; to test unconstitutional laws; and to chal-
lenge certain judicial decisions ("cassation amparo"), the most
widely-used form of amparo.
37
Even with this expansion of the writ, it did not turn into a
sweeping authorization for the judiciary to review acts of the Leg-
islature or acts of the states. It was very much a hybrid of two
legal traditions. It did, undoubtedly, seek to graft some aspects of
American common law and the tradition of Marbury v. Madison
onto the Mexican constitutional structure. Thus, the "Otero for-
mula," 38 named after the distinguished Mexican jurist and politi-
cian Mariano Otero, was a key development. It provided that the
amparo judgment should make "no general declaration about the
law or act" at issue. 39 In other words, an amparo judgment hold-
ing a law unconstitutional had to limit itself to granting such pro-
tection in the specific case in litigation, and have no effect beyond
the immediate party complainant.
This is not judicial review United States-style. This is not a sys-
tem of government in which judicial precedent and stare decisis
rule the day. Rather, each decision is made on a blank slate. As a
legal matter, no case bears precedential value (although that may
not be true as a practical matter). One consequence is that the
government may be found to violate a constitutional right in a
particular amparo case. Even if the government continues to vio-
late the same right, each case has to be brought and decided, one
by one.
One fascinating development over time that truly blends the
United States system with the civil law system is the notion of
jurisprudencia, or what I will call the "five-case" rule. Under the
five-case rule of Mexican jurisprudence, binding precedent is -
indeed - created from judicial decisions. This is not, as in the
United States system, a matter of stare decisis or some notion that
courts are constitutionally bound to follow past precedent.
Rather, it is a rule of convenience and efficiency. If the Supreme
Court or an amparo court reaches the same decision by a 2/3 ma-
jority in five consequtive judgments or "theses," that decision is
reduced to writing. It is then made binding on other courts and
judges. 40 This is based on the notion that judges should not waste
37. Id. at 323-24.
38. Id. at 319.
39. Zamudio, supra note 33, at 319.
40. Id. at 346-47.
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precious time and resources writing opinions in case after case
(opinion writing is an essential component of the civil law tradi-
tion) if the same ruling is going to be repeated.
In this fashion, the courts are in effect codifying their own laws,
like a great judicial Restatement, creating a form of precedent
that becomes binding only after judges do the same dance five
times in a row.
As Dr. Gamas has noted, United States precedent (including the
law regarding habeas corpus) has played a role in this evolution,
as Mexico has constructed its own democratic system. However,
the most fascinating piece of this story is that Mexico has man-
aged to invent its own creative brand of judicial review, true to its
own Mexican history and to its own heritage as a civil law juris-
diction.
There are a few lessons that we in the United States can learn
from the story of the Mexican amparo, which has taken root
throughout much of Latin America, as we will hear throughout
this conference.
At bottom, the now-complex legal creature known as amparo is
designed to serve as a potent force to protect rights of citizens un-
der the Mexican Constitution. At the same time, it incorporates a
healthy measure of restraint so that the courts do not slip over the
line into legislative territory, an especially crucial check in a civil
law system. As Judge Smith has explained, even in a system like
that in the United States built upon a generous notion of judicial
review that began with Marbury, we must be vigilant that the
delicate balance between legislative acts and judge-made law re-
mains intact.
I am not suggesting that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals or
the United States Supreme Court should adopt the five-case rule
of jurisprudencia that has evolved in Mexico. However, it serves
as an innovative reminder that gradualism has its virtues, espe-
cially when courts are treading close to territory that may belong
to Congress or to the states. There may be ways for federal judges
in the United States to borrow from this experience. For instance,
they could do this by using plurality opinions and concur-
rences/dissents to move the law forward more slowly in certain
instances. In this country, we tend to think of plurality decisions
(that do not technically have the weight of precedent) and deci-
sions that are split due to concurrences and dissents, as a sign of
indecision and weakness. Yet, in considering the virtues of the
five-case rule in the law of amparo, one can discern that these de-
vices can also constitute a prudent means of gradually establish-
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ing a track record over time. This can be especially important be-
fore taking the plunge in an area that may be close to the line and
subject a court to criticism that it has usurped another branch's
power in exercising judicial review.
For example, the United States Supreme Court's plurality opin-
ion in the recent case of Vieth v. Jubelirer,41 dealing with the con-
troversial issue of "political gerrymandering," was a disappoint-
ment to many constitutional scholars. Rather than telling us di-
rectly whether Davis v. Bandemer42 was overruled and whether
political gerrymandering could ever trigger a valid claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court appeared to be splintered in
five directions. When one considers the decision from a broader
perspective, however, perhaps that inconclusive result was not so
bad. Indeed, it may have been intentional on the part of the
Court. It allows room for a gradual accretion of the law on a topic
that has the potential to usurp a portion of the sovereignty of the
states in a highly politically-charged area.
Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lo-
pez,43 dealing with the Commerce Clause, was a disappointment
to some jurists and scholars, particularly those who favored a
more conservative approach that would roll back the Court's
precedent with respect to the authority of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. Lopez stopped short of that dramatic change.
It set forth a three-part test that still leaves many questions un-
answered. Perhaps that, too, is not so bad. The concurrence of
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, which was crucial to the majority
garnering five votes, served the function of putting the brakes on
any radical departure from precedent. Those justices sent the
message: "Time out! We're talking about the scope of Congress'
power, here, and the extent to which judicial review can be used to
supplant Congress' own determination of how far it is permitted to
go under the Commerce Clause. Maybe we should slow down and
assess this over a series of cases." That is not necessarily evidence
of weakness or indecision. Perhaps it is a sign of maturity in a
federal system. Like the five-case rule that has developed under
the Mexican amparo, courts in the United States at times may
benefit from taking advantage of those devices - plurality opin-
ions, concurrences/dissents, and the infrequently-used "political
question" doctrine - to move slowly and develop a track record, in
41. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
42. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
43. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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order to maintain the delicate balance among the three branches
of government.
Finally, there is room for both Mexican and American lawyers
and judges to learn a great deal from each other when it comes to
the fascinating subject of "New Judicial Federalism." This term
refers to the increased reliance by state courts on state constitu-
tions in the process of protecting individual rights. 44 Dr. Gamas
and I had a great chat at dinner last night, in which I learned that
five of the thirty-plus states in Mexico have some form of amparo
under their state constitutions. States are bound by the federal
Constitution and Bill of Rights in Mexico; yet they are free to
grant their citizens more rights, and some are becoming empow-
ered using their own state constitutions to do just that. Dr. Ga-
mas explained that the progress on this front has been very re-
cent. It has been accomplished through tiny, incremental steps.
Yet, it is an important new development.
That is the same story in the United States. Since the late
1970s, states have dusted off their own constitutions as a source of
independent rights, and the law that has emerged is truly a con-
stitutional revolution of sorts. In a number of states, including
Pennsylvania, courts have not only encouraged but almost man-
dated that lawyers and judges raise separate state constitutional
claims to develop this rich body of jurisprudence. 45 As a result,
there is now a parallel body of law that has evolved in most of the
fifty states. Thus, a notion of judicial review is equally alive in the
state courts.
What is clear from studying the rich history of the Mexican am-
paro, both at the federal and state level, and comparing it to the
doctrine of judicial review in the United States, is that our proce-
dures in the two countries may be different, but the substance of
the rights being protected is the same. The goal of the courts, in
both instances, is to give potency to those rights, for all citizens,
while at the same time protecting the institutions of government
that must endure longer than any particular litigant or judge in-
volved in any particular case.
To the extent that this conference will bring us a step closer to
accomplishing that noble endeavor in all of our nations in the
Americas, it will have been as worthwhile as it has been enjoyable
44. See Gormley et al., supra note 32, at 17-24.
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
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joining this gathering, sharing time with such a wonderful group
of scholars and friends.
